We present a dynamic model of the evolution of host resistance to avian brood parasites, when the latter can retaliate against hosts that reject parasitic eggs. In a verbal model, Zahavi (1979, American Naturalist, 113, 157-159) suggested that retaliatory cuckoos might prevent the evolution of host resistance by reducing the reproductive success of rejecter hosts (i.e. by destroying their eggs or nestlings). Here we develop a model based on the association between the great spotted cuckoo, Clamator glandarius, and its main host, the European magpie, Pica pica, because this is the only system that has provided supportive evidence, to date, for the existence of retaliatory behaviour. Our aims were (1) to derive the conditions for invasion of the retaliation strategy in a nonretaliatory parasite population and (2) to investigate the consequences of retaliation for the evolution of host defence. If we assume a cost of discrimination for rejecter hosts in the absence of parasitism, and a cost paid by a retaliator for monitoring nests, our model shows cyclical dynamics. There is no evolutionarily stable strategy, and populations of both hosts and parasites will cycle indefinitely, the period of the cycles depending on mutation and/or migration rate. A stable polymorphism of acceptors and rejecters occurs only when parasites are nonretaliators. The spread of retaliator parasites drives rejecter hosts to extinction.
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Interspecific brood parasitism is a means of reproduction in which some individuals, the parasites, are reared by unrelated individuals belonging to another species, the hosts. This reproductive strategy can be extremely costly for hosts because the reproductive success of a parasitized host is usually dramatically reduced, sometimes with complete loss of a clutch (Rothstein 1990) . The reduction of host reproductive success varies according to both host and parasite species. Some host species are able to discriminate parasitic eggs and either reject or abandon them (Rothstein 1990) . In other species, acceptance of parasitic eggs is common (Rothstein 1990; Brooker & Brooker 1996) . Because acceptance of cuckoo eggs generally lowers host reproductive success (even in the case where both host and cuckoo chicks are reared together), this behaviour appears to be maladaptive.
Several hypotheses have been put forward to explain the coexistence of ejection and acceptance within a host population. The evolutionary lag hypothesis assumes that all hosts have not yet evolved the faculty to discriminate correctly against the parasite (Dawkins & Krebs 1979; Davies & Brooke 1988; Rothstein 1990) . Alternatively, brood parasites and their hosts might have reached an evolutionary equilibrium (Lotem et al. 1991 (Lotem et al. , 1995 Marchetti 1992) . In this case, persistence of acceptance would be the result of an adaptive balance between costs (e.g. rejection errors) and benefits of host resistance (Lotem & Nakamura 1998).
Another type of cost for rejecter hosts could arise from the parasite itself, as suggested by Zahavi (1979) . If the parasite revisits parasitized nests and preys upon nests where the parasitic egg has disappeared, the advantage for discriminating hosts is reduced or disappears. This retaliatory or 'Mafia' behaviour by parasites could thus prevent the fixation of the rejection strategy in a host population. Recently, Pagel et al. (1998) developed a theoretical model of retaliatory behaviour by cuckoos and investigated how retaliation affects host strategies of rejecting versus accepting the cuckoo chicks. They showed that, in
